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RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NOTEs-LiABILITY FOR FORGED CHEcKx-Plaintiff

entered into negotiations to purchase certain goods from the L. Corporation, through three men who purported to be agents of said
corporation, though in reality the corporation did not exist. Upon
reaching an agreement, the fraudulent agents signed a contract and
a performance bond in the name of the non-existent corporation.
Thereafter, plaintiff gave the purported officers a check payable to
the L. Corporation which was drawn upon the defendant-bank. The
agents had the check cashed at a depository bank, and the check was
finally paid in due course by the defendant-drawee. After the plaintiff learned that the L. Corporation was non-existent and not having
received the goods contracted for, he brought this action against the
defendant-bank to have recredited the amount charged to his account
for this check. The lower courts gave judgment to the defendant
on the ground that the plaintiff intended the check to be payable to
the persons he had dealt with in this face to face transaction. Held,
judgment reversed because the plaintiff did not intend to give title
to the check to the fraudulent agents, but only to the non-existent
corporation. Hence, since the defendant paid the check to one other
than the designated and intended payee, the drawee is liable to the
drawer for the unauthorized disposition of its funds. International
Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N. Y. 285,
- N. E. - (1948).
The basic premise underlying such cases as the instant one is
that the drawee-bank may charge the drawer's account only when
it does so in accordance with the drawer's instructions.' Whether
such a charge against the drawer is valid is determined by the question whether or not title passed to the fraudulent party who professed to be the payee or rightful holder. The answer depends mainly
on the intent of the drawer.2 In a number of cases it has been held
that where the drawer deals face to face with one who fraudulently
represents that he is another person that title to the instrument passes
to such imposter and, hence, the drawee-bank may lawfully debit the
drawer's account. 3 In such a situation the courts sometimes say that
1Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371
(1891); Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881 (1885).
2

Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E.

2d 457 (1937); Halsey v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 134,

200 N. E. 671 (1936).
3 Ryan v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust and Say. Ass'n, 106 Cal. App. 690,
289 Pac. 863 (1930); Cornith Bank and Trust Co. v. Security Nat. Bank, 148
Tenn. 136, 252 S. W. 1001 (1923); McHenry v. Old Citizens Nat. Bank,
85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N. E. 395 (1911).
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the drawer has a double intent: to make the instrument payable to
the person before him; and to make it payable to the person whom
he believes the impersonator to be. The courts then conclude that
the dominant
intent is to transfer title to the person standing before
4
the drawer.
The problem then arises as to how to ascertain the intent of a
drawer in the type of situation presented in the instant case, that is,
where the fraudulent imposter represents that he is an agent for a
named principal. In such a case the courts almost unanimously hold
that title does not pass to the person standing before the drawer because he intends to transfer title only to the supposed agent's principal. 5 This rule is so whether the principal is an existent or nonexistent person, for the mere fact that there was no such person as
the purported principal does not change the drawer's intent. 6
In the New York cases which have arisen upon similar fact
situations it has also been held that title does not pass to the bogus
agent; the result being that neither a holder in due course nor a
drawee-bank acquires any rights in the instrument. 7
The instant case, therefore, is in accord with the authorities both
in other jurisdictions and in New York. The facts clearly showed
that the plaintiff intended to deal with the non-existent corporation,
and not with the purported agents. For this reason the conclusion
in the case was correct, for, as we have seen, the basic test in this
type of case is the drawer's intent.
J.M.N.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM

OF PRESS-RESTRICTION

BY

STATUTE.-A criminal complaint charged the defendant with unlaw-

fully publishing and causing to be published in a newspaper the identity of a certain female who had been raped. A Wisconsin statute
forbade the divulging of such identification.' The lower court, up4 Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E.
2d 457 (1937); Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co.,
94 N. J. L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920).
5 Bennett v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Cal. App. 450, 190 Pac. 831 (1920);
Moore v. Moultrie Banking Co., 39 Ga. App. 687, 148 S. E. 311 (1929); Dana
v. Old Colony Trust Co., 245 Mass. 347, 139 N. E. 541 (1923).
6 Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank, 235 N. Y. 68, 138 N. E. 739
(1923).
7 Strang v. Westchester, supra note 6; United Stores Co. v. American Raw
Silk Co., 184 App. Div. 217, 171 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1st Dep't 1918), af'd, 229
N. Y. 532, 129 N. E. 904 (1920).
1 Wis. Stats. § 348.412 (1945) which provides: "Any person who shall
publish or cause to be published in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or circular, except as the same may be necessary in the institution or prosecution of
any civil or criminal court proceeding, or in the compilation of the records
pertaining thereto, the identity of a female who may have been raped or subjected to any similar criminal assault, shall be punished by imprisonment in the

